

**BEFORE THE TENNESSEE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION**

IN RE:        Gordon E. & Tera F. Stalcup                                     )  
                Ward 056, Block 019, Parcel 00018                         ) Shelby County  
                Residential Property   )  
                Tax Year 2005   )

## INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER

## Statement of the Case

The subject property is presently valued as follows:

<u>LAND VALUE</u>	<u>IMPROVEMENT VALUE</u>	<u>TOTAL VALUE</u>	<u>ASSESSMENT</u>
\$183,200	\$66,800	\$250,000	\$62,500

An appeal has been filed on behalf of the property owner with the State Board of Equalization. The undersigned administrative judge conducted a hearing in this matter on February 15, 2006 in Memphis, Tennessee. In attendance at the hearing were Gordon E. Stalcup, the appellant, and Shelby County Property Assessor's representative Ron Palmer.

## FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Subject property consists of a single family residence located at 80 S. Mendenhall Road in Memphis, Tennessee.

The taxpayer contended that subject property should be valued at \$194,800 as it was prior to the 2005 countywide reappraisal program. In support of this position, the taxpayer argued that the reappraisal program caused the appraisal of subject property to increase excessively. The taxpayer argued that subject residence is in such poor physical condition it has little, if any, contributory value. In addition, the taxpayer asserted that subject property's location on a dangerous curve causes a diminution in value. Finally, the taxpayer introduced vacant land sales and sales of improved parcels in support of his contention of value.

The assessor contended that subject property should be valued at \$215,000. In support of this position, a spreadsheet summarizing five comparable sales was introduced into evidence. Mr. Palmer claimed that the comparables would normally support adoption of a significantly higher estimate of market value. Given the condition of subject property, however, Mr. Palmer recommended adoption of a value of \$215,000.

The basis of valuation as stated in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 67-5-601(a) is that "[t]he value of all property shall be ascertained from the evidence of its sound, intrinsic and immediate value, for purposes of sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer without consideration of speculative values . . ."

After having reviewed all the evidence in the case, the administrative judge finds that the subject property should be valued at \$215,000 as contended by the assessor of property.

Since the taxpayer is appealing from the determination of the Shelby County Board of Equalization, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. See State Board of Equalization Rule 0600-1-.11(1) and *Big Fork Mining Company v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board*, 620 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. App. 1981).

The administrative judge would observe that both the administrative judge and Assessment Appeals Commission heard Mr. Stalcup's previous appeal in conjunction with the 2001 Shelby County reappraisal program. The administrative judge finds that this appeal raises the same issues from both an evidentiary and value standpoint. Once again, the administrative judge finds that the taxpayer's proof was most impressive from a quantitative perspective. However, the administrative judge also finds once again that Mr. Stalcup introduced insufficient evidence to reliably establish the market value of subject property or quantify the loss in value due to its physical condition or location.

The administrative judge finds that the fair market value of subject property as of January 1, 2005 constitutes the relevant issue. The administrative judge finds that the Assessment Appeals Commission has repeatedly rejected arguments based upon the amount by which an appraisal has increased as a consequence of reappraisal. For example, the Commission rejected such an argument in *E.B. Kissell, Jr.* (Shelby County, Tax Years 1991 and 1992) reasoning in pertinent part as follows:

The rate of increase in the assessment of the subject property since the last reappraisal or even last year may be alarming but is not evidence that the value is wrong. It is conceivable that values may change dramatically for some properties, even over so short of time as a year. . .

The best evidence of the present value of a residential property is generally sales of properties comparable to the subject, comparable in features relevant to value. Perfect comparability is not required, but relevant differences should be explained and accounted for by reasonable adjustments. If evidence of a sale is presented without the required analysis of comparability, it is difficult or impossible for us to use the sale as an indicator of value. . . .

Final Decision and Order at 2.

The administrative judge finds that after all is said and done, Mr. Stalcup's contended value is based upon the previous appraisal of subject property. Respectfully, the administrative judge finds it highly unlikely subject property's market value has remained exactly the same over a four year period. The administrative judge finds that the prior appraisal of subject property simply has no precedential value given a January 1, 2005 assessment date.

The administrative judge finds that the various sales introduced by Mr. Stalcup are certainly relevant. However, they have not been adjusted. The administrative judge finds that the above-quoted language from the Commission's *Kissell* decision makes clear the need to adjust comparable sales in order for them to have probative value. The administrative judge finds that the procedure normally followed in the sales comparison approach has been summarized in one authoritative text as follows:

To apply the sales comparison approach, an appraiser follows a systematic procedure.

1. Research the competitive market for information on sales transactions, listings, and offers to purchase or sell involving properties that are similar to the subject property in terms of characteristics such as property type, date of sale, size, physical condition, location, and land use constraints. The goal is to find a set of comparable sales as similar as possible to the subject property.
2. Verify the information by confirming that the data obtained is factually accurate and that the transactions reflect arm's-length, market considerations. Verification may elicit additional information about the market.
3. Select relevant units of comparison (e.g., price per acre, price per square foot, price per front foot) and develop a comparative analysis for each unit. The goal here is to define and identify a unit of comparison that explains market behavior.
4. Look for differences between the comparable sale properties and the subject property using the elements of comparison. Then *adjust the price of each sale property to reflect how it differs from the subject property or eliminate that property as a comparable*. This step typically involves using the most comparable sale properties and then adjusting for any remaining differences.
5. Reconcile the various value indications produced from the analysis of comparables into a single value indication or a range of values.

[Emphasis supplied]

Appraisal Institute, *The Appraisal of Real Estate* at 422 (12<sup>th</sup> ed. 2001).

The administrative judge finds that although subject property may have numerous physical deficiencies, it is still habitable and has contributory value. The administrative judge finds that the taxpayer introduced insufficient evidence to establish that a prospective buyer would raze the existing dwelling.

The administrative judge finds merely reciting factors that could cause a diminution in value does not establish the current appraisal exceeds market value. The administrative judge finds the Assessment Appeals Commission has ruled on numerous occasions that one must *quantify* the loss in value one contends has not been adequately considered. See, e.g., *Fred & Ann Ruth Honeycutt* (Carter Co., Tax Year 1995) wherein the Assessment Appeals

Commission ruled that the taxpayer introduced insufficient evidence to quantify the loss in value from the stigma associated with a gasoline spill. The Commission stated in pertinent part as follows:

The assessor conceded that the gasoline spill affected the value of the property, but he asserted that his valuation already reflects a deduction of 15% for the effects of the spill. . . . The administrative judge rejected Mr. Honeycutt’s claim for an additional reduction in the taxable value, noting that he had not produced evidence by which to quantify the effect of the “stigma.” The Commission finds itself in the same position. . . . Conceding that the marketability of a property may be affected by contamination of a neighboring property, we must have proof that allows us to quantify the loss in value, such as sales of comparable properties. . . Absent this proof here we must accept as sufficient, the assessor’s attempts to reflect environmental condition in the present value of the property.

Final Decision and Order at 1-2. Similarly, in *Kenneth R. and Rebecca L. Adams* (Shelby Co., Tax Year 1998) the Commission ruled in relevant part as follows:

The taxpayer also claimed that the land value set by the assessing authorities. . .was too high. In support of that position, she claimed that. . .the use of surrounding property detracted from the value of their property. . . . As to the assertion the use of properties has a detrimental effect on the value of the subject property, that assertion, without some valid method of quantifying the same, is meaningless.

Final Decision and Order at 2.

ORDER

It is therefore ORDERED that the following value and assessment be adopted for tax year 2005:

<u>LAND VALUE</u>	<u>IMPROVEMENT VALUE</u>	<u>TOTAL VALUE</u>	<u>ASSESSMENT</u>
\$183,200	\$31,800	\$215,000	\$53,750

It is FURTHER ORDERED that any applicable hearing costs be assessed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501(d) and State Board of Equalization Rule 0600-1-.17.

Pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-301—325, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501, and the Rules of Contested Case Procedure of the State Board of Equalization, the parties are advised of the following remedies:

1. A party may appeal this decision and order to the Assessment Appeals Commission pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501 and Rule 0600-1-.12 of the Contested Case Procedures of the State Board of Equalization. Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-1501(c) provides that an appeal **“must be filed within thirty (30) days from the date the initial decision is sent.”** Rule 0600-1-.12 of the Contested Case Procedures of the State Board of

Equalization provides that the appeal be filed with the Executive Secretary of the State Board and that the appeal “**identify the allegedly erroneous finding(s) of fact and/or conclusion(s) of law in the initial order**”; or

2. A party may petition for reconsideration of this decision and order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-317 within fifteen (15) days of the entry of the order. The petition for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking administrative or judicial review; or
3. A party may petition for a stay of effectiveness of this decision and order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-316 within seven (7) days of the entry of the order.

This order does not become final until an official certificate is issued by the Assessment Appeals Commission. Official certificates are normally issued seventy-five (75) days after the entry of the initial decision and order if no party has appealed.

ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2006.

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MARK J. MINSKY  
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE  
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES DIVISION

c: Gordon E. & Tera F. Stalcup  
Tameaka Stanton-Riley, Appeals Manager